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
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VIETNAM: Both sides are repositioning their forces in the Quang Tri City area preparatory to further heavy fighting.

South Vietnamese Airborne troops were withdrawn yesterday from inside the citadel after suffering heavy casualties. Government marine units reportedly will now assume the responsibility for attempting to clear the Communists both from the city and from within the citadel. During the rotation, sporadic enemy shellings hit South Vietnamese troops in the area. Several sharp ground clashes were reported on the northern and southern edges of the city.

West of Hue, the week-long barrage of over 10,000 rounds of enemy artillery fire against Fire Support Base Bastogne has forced the government to abandon this strategic position guarding the western approach to Hue. South Vietnamese units are regrouping near Bastogne, and additional reinforcements have been moved into the area in an attempt to preclude further Communist advances. The enemy's occupation of the base, however, puts them within easy artillery range of Hue.

The government's operation to recapture northern Binh Dinh Province met increased enemy resistance yesterday. Several sharp ground clashes were fought along Route 1 north of Landing Zone English, while Communist gunners hit the nearby town of Bong Son with over 200 rocket and mortar rounds. Farther inland, Kontum City was shelled with nearly a score of 122-mm. rockets on 26 July, the first significant attack on the city in more than a month. A North Vietnamese infantry regiment has moved back into the Kontum Pass area south of the city and has begun again to harass South Vietnamese military convoys traveling Route 14 between Pleiku and Kontum cities.

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New Pipeline Construction



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In the delta, the Communists have stepped up their attacks with several sharp engagements reported in Dinh Tuong, Kien Hoa, and An Xuyen provinces.

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Photography taken in mid-July of the dual pipeline under construction between the Chinese town of Ping-hsiang and Hai Duong in North Vietnam does not confirm that the system is operational, but suggests that it is nearly completed. Photography [redacted] has revealed another petroleum pipeline under construction parallel to the dual pipeline system. Intermittent construction of the new pipeline currently extends from the Dong Dang area to a few miles north of Hai Duong and has taken place in the last two weeks. Although the new construction route is only a few yards from the earlier pipeline at some points, there is no evidence that the two are actually connected. The new line will provide added import and distributive capacity in meeting North Vietnam's petroleum requirements. [redacted]

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CUBA: Fidel Castro's annual 26th of July speech provided the Cuban people with an elaborate explanation of the need for continued close ties with the USSR.

After some brief remarks on his recent trip to Africa, Eastern Europe, and the USSR, Castro gave considerable praise to the Soviet Union, particularly for the support it has given Cuba in the past. Castro asserted that Cuba's continued existence in the face of "imperialism's blockade" was primarily due to this support.

Castro's remarks reflected his awareness that Cuba, economically and militarily dependent upon Moscow, has no alternative now to cooperation with the Soviets. Fidel told his audience that economic and political integration with Latin America could solve many of Cuba's problems but that this would not be possible for many years. Castro also went to great length explaining why the only other alternative, resumption of ties with the US, was completely impossible under present circumstances.

Castro's solution, presented as the only other choice, was economic integration with the socialist bloc, an obvious reference to Havana's recent admission to the Soviet-led Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. He pointed out that this would be a temporary measure until integration with the nations of Latin America was possible, and defensively ridiculed charges that Cuba is a satellite of the Soviet Union.

Although Vietnam was the central theme of this year's 26th of July celebrations and one of the principal speakers was Nguyen Thi Binh, leader of the Viet Cong delegation to the Paris peace talks, Castro devoted only a few paragraphs to this subject. Most of his statements concerning Vietnam were aimed at US actions but he also said that victory in Vietnam requires "international solidarity," meaning greater support from the socialist nations.

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Although some dissatisfaction with certain aspects of Soviet policy was implied in last week's resolution of the central committee of the Cuban Communist Party, in his speech Castro did not express any obvious displeasure with Soviet policies. The resolution made Castro's reservations clear enough to the Soviet leadership, but his speech did not hint at any change in Cuban-Soviet relations.

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CHINA: Recent disruptions of public order in South China highlight Peking's continuing problems with disaffected youth.

The Down-to-the-Countryside program, a movement designed to break up unruly groups of urban Red Guards by requiring them to perform "temporary" labor in peasant communes, has been a major source of alienation since the 1968-1969 period. Large numbers of youths, lionized during the Cultural Revolution, apparently have concluded that their assignment to the countryside will be permanent and see little hope of employing the skills they acquired in school. Some in South China have attempted to escape to Hong Kong, but many more have simply returned illegally to their former urban environment. Because these returnees were not officially registered, they could not get regular jobs, and hence often turned to petty crime as their means of support.

[redacted] the nature and extent of crime, much of it committed by youths, have become steadily more serious. [redacted] armed gangs of several hundred youths recently clashed in Canton. The fighting was so fierce that local police were unable to halt it. [redacted] patrols by vigilante-style "workers' picket teams" have recently been reinforced, and [redacted] armed soldiers have reappeared on Canton streets.

These disturbances, which probably are not solely attributable to the illegal returnees, have occurred despite recent conciliatory measures by Canton authorities. [redacted] official residence permits are now being issued to youths, particularly if they turn themselves in. In addition, increasing numbers of graduates are being assigned directly to urban factory jobs instead of being sent to the countryside, and

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others are being brought back from the communes to take up similar jobs. Officials have used the stick as well as the carrot, however, and the more serious offenders are reportedly being shipped off to labor reform camps. [redacted] a detention center in one district of Canton is now full of "teenage criminals."

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Although most available information comes from South China, the problem of disaffected youth is known to be a national political issue. [redacted]

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[redacted] Moreover, recent radio broadcasts from populous Szechwan Province describing methods for overcoming the "bad habits" acquired by students on summer vacation suggest that the disruptions may not be confined to Canton. Despite the regime's efforts to cope with student complaints, upward mobility in higher education is still limited, and openings for non-agricultural employment remain relatively restricted. Endemic problems among the younger generation will thus be hard to overcome.

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ZAIRE: President Mobutu Sese Seko is moving ahead with his plan to reshuffle the army high command.

On 25 July the government announced that more than half the army's generals will retire by 30 September. Those affected include the army commander, General Bobozo, who has been on the inactive list for almost two years because of ill health, and the acting commander, General Bosango. The order also applies to five of the army's seven divisional commanders.

Mobutu has spent several months carefully laying the groundwork for a major army reorganization. He is sensitive to army politics, and his major concern has been to appoint replacements who will not upset the delicate balance of loyalties and personal rivalries within the senior ranks. Unless he makes some serious miscalculations in new appointments, not yet announced, he should be able to carry out the reorganization without disaffecting the army's upper echelons, still the ultimate source of his political power.

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TUNISIA: Foreign Minister Masmoudi's call for the withdrawal of US and Soviet fleets from the Mediterranean diverges sharply from President Bourguiba's support for the US presence.

At a press conference in Ankara, Masmoudi is reported to have said the fleets constitute a "military pollution" and urged their expulsion. His comments mark a significant step beyond his previous attacks on US-USSR spheres of influence in the Mediterranean that stopped short of calling for the expulsion of the fleets.

This development points to a widening policy split between Masmoudi and Bourguiba. Bourguiba has always linked Tunisia's security interests to a strong US presence in the Mediterranean. His appeal for big power intervention in the Middle East during President Sadat's visit to Tunisia in May undercut Masmoudi's denunciations of "US-USSR collusion." Bourguiba reacted to Sadat's expulsion of Soviet advisers by calling for a US-Soviet summit, while Masmoudi renewed his appeal for a Mediterranean security conference and initiated a new move for an Arab summit.

Bourguiba may now decide to discipline Masmoudi, at the risk of aggravating personal rivalries in the already factionalized Destourian Socialist Party (PSD). Despite his poor health, Bourguiba is determined to dominate Tunisian policy-making and is not likely to tolerate Masmoudi's independent stance on major foreign policies. Masmoudi, however, may gain support from others in the PSD hierarchy who disagree with Bourguiba's policy of maintaining exceptionally close ties with the US. The party is further divided between leaders who wish to liberalize Tunisian politics and those who favor Bourguiba's concept of centralized leadership.

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